Ian Hunter I I n launching his intervention into the philosophy of history in the 1970s, Hayden White began by declaring that the lack of an "unambiguous" historical record requires the metahistorian to recover the prefigurative "tropes" or structures that are the condition of this record assuming the form of a meaningful object of historical knowledge:
Historical accounts purport to be verbal models, or icons, of specific segments of the historical process. But such models are needed because the documentary record does not figure forth an unambiguous image of the structure of events attested in them. In order to figure "what really happened" in the past, therefore, the historian must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole set of events reported in the documents. . . . In the poetic act which precedes the formal analysis of the field, the historian both creates his object of analysis and predetermines the modality of the conceptual strategies he will use to explain it. 1 There is, of course, no doubting that we post-Kantians can treat the ambiguous or uncertain character of the historical record as an opportunity to seek its coherence in prefigurative or transcendental cognitive structures. Even so, why would you want to? After all, since the fourteenth century humanist philologists and historians have been raising all kinds of doubts about the historical record-regarding conflicting sources, corrupt texts, misattributed contexts-and addressing them with critical principles, but apparently feeling no need to resolve them by turning to transcendental structures. 2 According to White, though, going transcendental or "formalist" is not a matter of choice, because it is the hidden presence of prefigurative cognitive structures or tropes that allows the raw "events" of the historical record to assume the form of an object of knowledge in the first place. Were we to choose not to recover these structures, then we would be acting like the nineteenthcentury historical "realists"-Michelet, Tocqueville, and Ranke-who mistook their own prefigurations for historical facts (M 40) .
But this response seems tailored to make the choice to go transcendental seem necessary or inevitable. If the form and level of doubt about the historical record is such that it can only be resolved by searching for its deep prefigurative conditions, then of course we have no choice but to search for them, for not to do so would be to remain ignorant of how we already imbue the record with coherence and meaning.
3 Why, though, should we subject the historical record to this particular form and level of doubt-that is, the form that requires us to seek transcendental cognitive conditions in order to allay it? Again, the doubts of the humanist historians were not of this kind, yet they were anything but naïve realists. I am suggesting, then, that one cannot remove the voluntarist dimension of White's pursuit of metahistorical deep structures by claiming that this pursuit is necessary to resolve doubt about the historical record, because whether and how one comes to doubt the historical record might also contain an element of will and decision. This is the issue that is raised in the antiskeptical dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy and that can be summarized in the aphorism that "Doubt has its conditions too." One of the central contentions of Wittgenstein's antiskepticism is that we have become accustomed to insisting that knowledge has conditions without paying sufficient attention to the fact that doubt does too. This issue becomes acute when, as in the case of White's metahistory, a particular exercise of doubt is required in order to pose the question of the transcendental conditions of knowledge. Wittgenstein's decisive intervention here was to insist that doubt is internal to particular "language games." This means that whether and how one doubts is not dependent on the nature of consciousness or experience, but on whether one is prepared to engage in those particular customary activities (or "games") that give doubt its point, or fail to:
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So how then does doubt get expressed? For me: in a language-game, and not merely in certain ways of speaking. Perhaps in looking more closely, thus in a quite complicated activity. But this expression of doubt by no means always has a sense or purpose.
One simply forgets that doubting too belongs to a language-game. 4 This is why doubting can be a matter of will and decision: "What I need to show is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible." 5 This applies in particular to what Wittgenstein calls "philosophical doubt," which is the species of doubt internal to the language games of philosophers, and which might have no purpose beyond their particular way of life.
Following Wittgenstein, then, we might say that rather than the chaotic or indeterminate character of experience leading to doubt, it is the ex-hayden white's philosophical history ercise of a certain practice of doubt that leads experience to be treated as chaotic or indeterminate. The reason that the doubts of the humanist historians and philologists did not lead to a search for transcendental conditions while White's do is that the practice of transcendental doubt driving White's search did not emerge until the late eighteenth century. I will argue that White's practice of transcendental doubt first emerged in the context of Kantian metaphysics, specifically in the form of Kant's problematization of the intelligibility of the "manifold of perception." Until the 1780s there was no doubt exercise or language game that could trigger the search for transcendental conditions, and no form of academic-philosophical life in which it could be integrated in the grooming of philosophers and philosophical historians, although there were of course many other forms of doubt-Pyrrhonistic, neo-Platonic, Cartesian-serving a variety of spiritual, ethical, and epistemological purposes.
We can now return to the question that we first posed with regard to the undertaking of White's exercise in transcendental doubt and reflection-But why would you want to?-and draw out the two interlaced lines of inquiry that flow from its voluntaristic challenge. In the first place we can treat this as a question in the history of philosophy and the history of historiography: What were the intellectual-historical conditions or contexts that first made it possible for a certain kind of intellectualthe philosophical historian-to feel compelled to seek transcendental conditions for historical knowledge? More specifically, to what extent is White's search for the transcendental tropology of history internal to the history of Kantianism as a particular way of academic life? Secondly, we can also treat this as a question about the existential choice of a particular way of academic life that arises at the interstices of history and philosophy: Why would you want to choose a form of doubt that sends you in pursuit of history's tropological deep structures when nothing about the nature of historical knowledge itself requires you to do so? This is a question prompting investigation of the motivational sources of certain acts of intellectual self-problematization and self-cultivation.
In asking these questions, we are of course proposing to submit White's practice of history to a contextual historical investigation and description, treating it as an object for a certain kind of history of philosophy and history of historiography. In doing so, we will be claiming to provide an empirically true contextual account of White's philosophical history, which is to say an account that could be shown to be false in various regards and hence superseded by a better empirical account. Needless to say, there will be many who will declare this to be a fundamentally flawed strategy that is doomed from the outset. Surely any contextual history of the discourse of transcendental prefiguration must itself be transcendentally prefigured, turning its claim to empirical truthfulness into a symptom of its failure to grasp its own transcendental conditions. 6 This kind of objection must be forcefully rejected, however, in part because it seeks to preempt the proposed investigation on purely a priori and potentially sectarian grounds-by declaring that contextual inquiry must itself be transcendentally prefigured-and in part because those who make it are themselves philosophical historians seeking to protect their discipline from historicization. After all, the object of the proposed investigation into White's philosophical history is whether contextualist historical description must be treated as transcendentally prefigured, or whether treating it in this way is a voluntaristic philosophical exercise open to contextualist historical description.
The point of mobilizing Wittgenstein's account of doubt as a practice taking place within a language game was to open a space in which transcendental doubt-thence the pursuit of transcendental conditions of historical knowledge-can be investigated as a willed intellectual exercise, hence as the object of an historical account of the performance of that exercise. That is the space-previously characterized as the "history of theory"-that we will now proceed to occupy: first by investigating how White motivates the pursuit of transcendental structures, then by describing the Kantian subculture that permitted White to undertake this pursuit, and finally by discussing the "psychagogical" and cultural-political context of Whitean philosophical history in the American academy.
II
In order to investigate how White motivates and justifies the pursuit of transcendental structures, we need to begin with an outline of the path that he charts from the chaotic surface of historical experience and representation to its structuring transcendental depths. White crosses the Rubicon into the land of philosophical history through his declaration that "the historian confronts a veritable chaos of events" from which he "makes his story by including some events and excluding others" (M 6). According to White, the historian does this by (unconsciously) selecting from four formal "modes of emplotment"-"Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire"-which are not determined by the chaotic "data" that they narrativize, and which produce the appearance of explanations as a surface "affect" or feeling (M x, 7-11). The modes of emplotment are in turn coordinated with four forms of "discursive argumentation"-"Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism"-which also produce "explanatory affects," here at the level of argumentational structure, for example, the positing of causal laws (Mechanism) or teleological goals (Organicism) (M 11-21) . 7 But these quadruplex forms of emplotment and argumentation are themselves supposed to be determined by an even deeper level that White calls "poetic and prefigurative." The four "linguistic modes" of this level-"Metaphor, Synecdoche, Metonymy, and Irony"-are understood as "modes of consciousness" that constitute the foundational "formalist" or transcendental structures of "historical consciousness." They order the historical "field of perception" and thus form the "deep structures of the historical imagination" (M xi, [30] [31] . Since the explanatory emplotments and arguments are underdetermined by the historical data or evidence, and shaped by the prefigurative poetic structures of the historical imagination, this means that choices among historical explanations are not determined "epistemologically" but are "moral and aesthetic," hence lacking in objective justification (M xii, 26) .
Clearly White regards this passage from the surface of historical experience and representation to its prefigurative depths as something more than a voluntary philosophical exercise. On the one hand, he regards it as necessitated by the "psychology" or epistemology of human experience itself-by the need to recover the transcendental structures that bring order to its otherwise "chaotic" phenomena. But White offers no justification for adopting this transcendental psychology, and we have drawn on Wittgenstein in order to suspend its normative claims by treating it as the architecture of a voluntary intellectual exercise. On the other hand, in keeping with his claim to be providing not just a philosophy of history but also a "history of historical consciousness in nineteenth-century Europe" (M 1), White also argues that the pursuit of transcendental structures has historical origins: namely, in an unfolding "crisis" in historical consciousness that began in early modernity and issued in nineteenth-century realism. Despite the nineteenth-century focus of Metahistory, White's account of the seventeenth-and eighteenthcentury "crisis" in the book's first chapter forms the threshold through which we enter his historiographic world, and thus requires a more careful and sustained investigation than it usually receives.
According to White, the Enlightenment historians of the eighteenth century were confronted by a radically divided historical field that had been bequeathed to them by their seventeenth-century predecessors. One pole of this field was occupied by "Ecclesiastical history and Ethnographic history," whose central characteristic was sectarian schism and division. Driven by confessional and racial passions, White's ecclesiastical and ethnographic historians were incapable of producing a unified historical field and gave rise instead to a "chaos" of opposed histories riven by parti pris and incapable of detached truth (M 59-60). The second pole of the seventeenth-century field was formed by "historical philology" and its "erudite antiquarians." Reacting to the schismatic ecclesiastical historians in particular, the philological historians sought to dampen rivalrous passions and establish historical continuity but, White claims, could do so only at the level of "temporal seriality as a mode of representation," hence in the form of the "chronicle" which is not yet "true" history. Displaying the fundamentally dialectical character of his philosophical history of historiography, White argues that the historiens galants of eighteenth-century France were unable to transcend the opposition between the passionate divisions of ecclesiastical history and the cold and merely temporal unity and truth supplied by the erudite philologists, which meant that their histories never rose above the level of "stories" geared to rhetorical effects and moral lessons.
The "Enlightenment historians" of the eighteenth century-"Voltaire, Gibbon, Hume, Kant, and Robertson"-were thus confronted by this same "crisis" or unresolved dialectical opposition, which, finally, they too could not overcome. This was not due to any aestheticist dalliance with moralizing stories, but for a quite different reason: namely, their "rationalist" adherence to a sharp division between the rational and the irrational, reason and imagination, which was in turn caused by their lack of an adequately dialectical "psychological theory": "The philosophes needed a theory of human consciousness in which reason was not set over against imagination as the basis of truth against the basis of error, but in which the continuity between reason and fantasy was recognized . . . and the process in which fantasy or imagination contributed as much to the discovery of truth as did reason itself might be perceived" (M 51). Lacking this reconciliatory theory of human consciousness, the "Enlighteners" thus remained transfixed by the gap between the rational and the irrational, idealized imagination and sensory truth, with the result that Enlightenment history was written in the Ironic register using satirical plot forms (M 54-55).
Bringing to bear the full force of his philosophical-historiographic machinery, White argues that, owing to its lack of a dialectical theory of human consciousness, Enlightenment historiography was figured by Metonymy ("division and opposition") rather than by Synecdoche ("continuity and interchange"), and that it deployed Mechanical forms of argumentation based on causal laws rather than Organicist ones based on unifying teleologies. Kant is put through the same mill, with White arguing that his mode of reflective consciousness was also hamstrung by a metonymic failure to reconcile the rational and the irrational andsomewhat surprisingly-that his histories were grounded in a divisive Mechanical causality rather than a unifying Organicist teleology of the kind that White ascribes to Leibniz (M 57-58). So, in the end, Kant too remained incapable of reconciling reason and imagination, sensory truth and idealistic fantasy, falling back into a Mechanical and Ironic mode of history. According to White, this paved the way to a more properly reconciliatory approach-"Metaphorical-Synecdochic"-in the Organicist philosophical history of Herder and then Hegel. At the same time, it also led to the "realism" of the nineteenth-century historians, who reacted to the Enlighteners' Ironic failure to reconcile fiction and fact by opting one-sidedly for the latter, thereby opening up a new chapter of dialectical history (M 79-80, 140-43).
Without attempting to capture all of the ensuing modifications to White's basic account, we can observe that in later essays he gave greater emphasis to the aesthetic and rhetorical dimension of the transcendental structures. In an influential essay from the mid-1980s, designed to ward of charges of relativism and defend his own version of historical "realism," White continued to argue that the "realist" discipline of nineteenth-century historiography was propelled into existence by the "chaos" of its seventeenth-and eighteenth-century precursors. 8 Here, though, he treats the latter as "amateurs" who conceived of the archive only as a "repository of tradition, moral exemplars, and admonitory lessons," to be mined for confessionally and politically opposed rhetorical histories (64-65). According to White, a disciplined empirical historiography emerged in the nineteenth century as an attempt to order this rhetorical chaos through a "de-rhetoricization of historical thinking" designed to distinguish objective history from novelistic fictions. Since he is precommitted to the view that all historical representation is the surface effect of transcendental rhetorical tropes, White can only regard this empirical historiography as symptomatic of the hegemony of another rhetorical and aesthetic regime-the "deliberative mode of the middle style." This he associates with the "beautiful," understood as an attempt to domesticate chaotic and unsettling historical events within the "common sense" of the existing cultural and political order (65-66). Drawing on the traditional Kantian pairing, White then contrasts this beautiful empiricism with a "sublime" style that glimpses history before its rhetorical domestication-seeing there its supposedly real "terror" and "meaninglessness"-and thereby opening a space for a so-called "visionary politics" capable of confronting a sublime reality (71-72).
There can be no doubting the remarkable intricacy of White's historiographic machinery, and the precision with which it divides opposed historical styles and projects their future supersession. This very precision raises the suspicion, though, that White's history of historiography might be insufficiently attuned to the contextual variety of historical writing and too committed to its future dialectical unity: that it might see too far and too little. In fact, White marshals whole epochs of historical writing in such a schematic manner-the radically divided character of seventeenth-century historiographies, followed by the failed reconciliation of the eighteenth-century Metonymic-Mechanical Ironists, pointing towards the Metaphorical-Synecdochic Organicists and naïve realists of the early nineteenth century-that we might suspect that his historical justification for pursuing transcendental structures is only a disguised version of the philosophical exercise. Nonetheless, we must begin by accepting White's claim to be offering a history of historical consciousness in order to note some evident differences between his schematism and other histories of historiography that cover a similar terrain, even if in the end we do not hold that claim against him.
Here there are three main issues to take note of, in summary presentation. First, it is difficult to see how White's dialectical account of seventeenth-century historiography-divided between a passionately confessionally fractured ecclesiastical history, and a detached and merely chronologically unified historical philology-can be sustained in the face of an array of contraindicating studies in the histories of these historiographies. On the one hand, recent studies of seventeenth-century ecclesiastical histories have indeed confirmed their confessionally divided character. Yet they have simultaneously shown that rather than being an impediment to technically sophisticated historical scholarship, confessional division typically intensified such scholarship. This is because the drive to defend particular theologies and ecclesiologies led deep into the domains of patristics, biblical criticism, and ecclesiastical history where ecclesiastical historians drew on the full apparatus of humanistic scholarship. 9 On the other hand, the patient erudition of the historical philologists did not issue in a scholarship so detached as to remove it from the critical questions of "true history" and place it on the dusty shelf of antiquarian chronicling. 10 Here the salient point is that there simply was no sharp division between the methods, objectives, problems, and personnel of the two forms of historical scholarship, even if their objects of inquiry differed in topic and scope.
11 Ecclesiastical historians such as Gottfried Arnold, Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, and Isaac de Beausobre thus availed themselves of the latest philological inquiries-into such matters as the authorship of the Old and New Testaments, the impact of Greek and gnostic philosophies on early Christianity, and the authenticity of confessionally fraught texts-in relation to which the rival (Catholic and Protestant) biblical criticism of Richard Simon and Jean Le Clerc played a kind of brokering role. 12 For their part, the erudite philologists could not resolve technical questions regarding the meaning of terms and the authenticity of texts without wide-ranging and deep historical knowledge-such as the knowledge of fifth-century Alexandrian neoPlatonism that Lorenzo Valla needed to establish the apocryphal status of the putatively apostolic writer "Dionysius the Areopagite"-and this knowledge was frequently used for confessional purposes, as was the case with Valla's unmasking of the Pseudo-Dionysius. 13 Second, if seventeenth-century historiography was thus not characterized by a dialectical opposition between its confessional and factual forms, then the pursuit of historiographic disinterestedness did not first emerge in a nineteenth-century realist historiography seeking to deal with the unresolved chaos of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century "rhetorical" history-whether by appealing to an incontestable factity or by imposing a "common sense" aesthetic hegemony. Rather, this pursuit emerged from the heart of seventeenth-century ecclesiastical history itself, but not in the form of the reified claim to objective knowledge that White identifies with historical "realism." In fact the pursuit of disinterested historical scholarship first appeared in confessionally fractured ecclesiastical history in a quite other form: namely, in the cultivation of "impartiality" as a particular kind of scholarly ethos or "stance." Perhaps the most wellknown attempt in this regard was Arnold's monumental Unparteyische Kirchen-und Ketzer-Historie (Impartial History of the Church and Heresy) of 1699.
14 Here the crucial thing to observe is that in contradistinction to epistemological critiques of nineteenth-century "realism," early modern impartiality was not an ideology grounded in a delusive belief in the objectivity of historical knowledge. Rather, it was understood as a fallible ethos or mode of intellectual conduct, cultivated through diverse ethical and technical precepts-to identify one's own confessional bias, restrain one's religious passions as far as possible, cultivate doctrinal indifference, consult the best available sources, adhere to the canons of textual criticism-that acknowledged the impossibility of objectively true historical knowledge. 15 Impartiality emerged not from the delusive misrecognition of transcendental structures, but from the inevitably flawed cultivation of a way of scholarly life.
Thirdly, if, as it begins to seem, seventeenth-century historiography was not characterized by an exemplary opposition between a passionately unhistorical ecclesiastical history and a dispassionately erudite philology, then it might also seem implausible to attempt to constitute an entire epoch of Enlightenment historiography-"Voltaire, Gibbon, Hume, Kant, and Robertson"-in terms of its failure to reconcile such an opposition. Rather, if we recall the deep-seated and volatile interaction of confessional cultural politics and technical historical scholarship within these seventeenth-century historiographies, then it seems much more likely that their reception by eighteenth-century historians would have no general form, and might vary widely and unpredictably in accordance with the ongoing volatility of that interaction as it played out in particular contexts.
Gibbon's relation to the ecclesiastical historians, for example, was not determined by his alleged failure to overcome the putative opposition between their confessional passions and the erudite detachment of the philologists. Rather it was characterized by the much more straightforward fact that he drew on them heavily (if not uncritically), especially in the writing of chapters 15 and 16 of the Decline and Fall. As we learn from John Pocock's remarkable study of Gibbon, the context for this reception was not Enlightenment rationalism but a milieu that Pocock calls the "Protestant Enlightenment." Pocock uses this phrase to characterize a historiographic culture-to which Arnold, Le Clerc, Beausobre, and Mosheim all belonged-that sought to reduce Christian teaching to the simple message of Christ's saving love, and to write the history of the church in terms of its deviation from this message. At the same time, even as it championed a view of the church as a purely human association-the distinguishing viewpoint of ecclesiastical history-this culture also insisted that understanding the church depended on extraordinarily profound and deeply contested theological doctrines regarding the nature of Christ and his earthly incarnation, as these had played a key role in configuring the church. 16 In other words, we might say that it was not Gibbon's lack of an adequately dialectical psychology or "theory of human consciousness" that determined his reception of the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century ecclesiastical historians, but an historical circumstance of a quite different kind: namely, the movement of his thought within the same "Protestant Enlightenment" culture as theirs, in which the historical understanding of the church would remain imbued by deeply embedded and inescapably conflictual theological doctrines, even for those who wished to escape their pull.
As with Gibbon, so too Kant's relation to the ecclesiastical historians cannot be understood in terms of his failure to overcome a putative dialectical split between their confessional tracts and the dry chronologies of the philologists, although Kant's relation to the ecclesiastical historians had nothing in common with Gibbon's. If Gibbon's work was marked by his deep immersion in the ecclesiastical historians and biblical critics, then Kant's was characterized by the absence of any reception of these traditions at all, and by his larger hostility towards empirical historiography. Formed in the specific milieu of Protestant university metaphysics, Kant's relation to ecclesiastical history was not hayden white's philosophical history characterized by the strategy of Pocock's "Protestant Enlightenment"-reducing Christianity to the message of Christ's love acceded to via faith, and then historicizing the church through its deviation from that message-but by a fundamentally different conception of Protestantism and enlightenment. 17 For Kant, the true message of Christianity was a philosophy of moral self-governance embedded in the scriptures and known through reason, while history was the progressive transformation of confessional Christianity into this moral philosophy. In his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant treats the biblical message as the crude "empirical" and "historical" form in which a saving philosophy had been addressed to humanity in its infancy-the philosophy of man's capacity to redeem his own fallen nature through his inner capacity for moral self-governance-such that the progressive refinement of biblical Christianity into self-redeeming moral philosophy is itself the motor and destiny of history. 18 This marked the birth of both philosophical hermeneutics and philosophical history, in whose footsteps White's metahistory would eventually tread.
We began our discussion by treating White's appeal to the "chaos" of the historical field as a tactic within a Kantian language game of transcendental doubt and reflection, and we drew on Wittgenstein's antiskeptical philosophy to excuse ourselves from playing along. Now we have reason to conclude that White's delineation of a "crisis" in historical consciousness, brought about by its supposed insufficiently dialectical character, should also be regarded as grounded in a particular kind of philosophical exercise, since White's dialectical diagnosis appears to have no basis in the history of historiography, and yet functions as a means of inducing the pursuit of transcendental structures. I would now suggest that we do greater justice to White's philosophical history if we discount his claims to be engaging in the history of historiography and treat his discourse as a particular practice of philosophy that takes historiography as its field of operation.
If White's account of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century historiographies bears little resemblance to those that we find in specialist histories of historiography, that is because his divided and chaotic "premodern" historical field is not an object of investigation and description. Rather, it is an intellectual condition that is invoked as the trigger for a particular kind of intellectual performance: the suspension of empirical attention to documents and contexts, and the reorientation of attention "inwards," onto the transcendental figura that are supposed to lie in the practitioner's own "mind" as the forms of "historical consciousness." Approached thus, as a concrete intellectual activity or "game," White's transcendental philosophical history can neither be false nor true. It would thus be no less misguided for us to attempt to criticize this philosophical history for its falsity than to defend it for its truth. We can, though, offer an empirical description of it as a particular kind of intellectual activity, and this description is capable of being true, which is to say, capable of being shown to be false.
If it is not the nature of historical cognition, then, that motivates the pursuit of transcendental foundations, how did this pursuit emerge as a voluntary or institutional intellectual practice? In asking this question we move to our second object of enquiry: an account of the Kantian subculture that permitted White to engage in this pursuit.
III
Looking back on his Metahistory in 1978, White could declare: "I will not apologize for this Kantian element in my thought, but I do not think that modern psychology, anthropology, or philosophy has improved upon it." 19 Since then, the presence of Kantian and neo-Kantian figures of thought in White's philosophy of history has become the subject of increasing attention. 20 This is so even amongst his closest followers where, for example, we find White's four prefigurative tropes treated as the philosophical-historical analogue of Kant's four kinds of transcendental category. 21 For the most part, however, these studies approach White's reception of Kantianism in terms of the transmission of fundamental philosophical propositions or ideas, which presents certain limitations for our present concerns.
First, such an approach tends to assume that Kant's philosophy is normatively true or historically foundational, hence that the pursuit of transcendental structures is indeed an intrinsic feature of human consciousness rather than a particular kind of intellectual practice. This would preclude us from investigating White's own pursuit of transcendental structures in terms of his historical reception of a Kantian intellectual subculture. Second, in viewing it in terms of the direct transmission of Kant's "ideas" or propositions, this approach overlooks the degree to which White's Kantianism belongs to a distinctively American reception of Kant, one whose roots lay in nineteenth-century "liberal" Protestantism, mediated in part by the philosophical movement of American pragmatism. As a result, the "propositional" approach pays insufficient attention to what White's Kantianism actually consists of-which, we will argue, lies less in particular philosophical doctrines than in the adoption of a broadly Kantian ethos and cultural politics.
With regards to the first of these concerns-the redescription of the Kantian pursuit of transcendental structures as the product of a particular intellectual subculture rather than as a feature of human consciousness-clearly we can only offer a brief outline suited to our present purposes. Here the crucial thing to observe is that the practice of transcendental doubt and reflection that White treats as a "theory of human consciousness" first emerged in Protestant Germany in the 1780s, where it formed part of Kant's remarkable retooling of Protestant university metaphysics. 22 Seen historically, Kant's achievement was to take over the fundamental architecture of this metaphysics-the conception of God as a noumenal intellect generating the pure (a priori) forms of things, and man as the sensory intelligence to whom these forms appear as empirical experience-but then to internalize and subjectivize it by treating it as the architecture of human subjectivity. From this historical adaptation arose Kant's double-sided conception of the human subject, consisting of a spontaneous intellect capable of generating the pure forms of experience and morality, and a passive sensibility in which these forms are registered as spatiotemporal appearances and sensuously distracted moral commands. 23 This duplex metaphysical anthropology in turn supplies the architecture for the Kantian practice of transcendental doubt and reflection. If space and time are the forms of human sensing rather than objects of sense perception, then sensory perception by itself cannot supply recognizable objects of experience or knowledge. Instead, it can only deliver a chaotic "manifold [multiplicity] of perception," which means that we must seek the synthesizing conditions of empirical experience at the level of transcendental forms of perception and thought. 24 For Kant of course to regard the perceptual field as a "rhapsodic" multiplicity was not a matter of choice, since he was precommitted to the anthropology of man as a mind wedded to a sensibility whose passivity means that it requires transcendental shaping or "selection." Equally clearly, though, for someone who is unaware of this metaphysical anthropology or is committed to another kind-Thomist, Stoic, Epicurean, and so onthere is no need to treat the perceptual field as chaotic, since Kantian anthropology itself supplies the rules of the "language game" or form of life within which this kind of transcendental doubt makes sense and outside which it does not. 25 Transcendental doubt is thus not an object of Kantian philosophy but an existential act that is the condition of engaging in it as a practice.
For those who moved within its orbit, the Kantian academic subculture had striking consequences for the understanding of history and the practice of historiography. As a discipline whose object was comprised of recorded temporal events, empirical historiography, when seen from the Kantian perspective, had to be understood as a knowledge that had not yet recovered its own transcendental conditions, giving rise to the founding premise of the Kantian philosophy of history. When seen from the same Kantian standpoint, history itself had to be understood as the unfolding of transcendental or moral imperatives in the domain of (otherwise) chaotic historical appearances-an understanding sometimes confusingly called "historicism"-this constituting the founding premise of philosophical history. 26 Given their conditions of historical emergence-as extrapolations from a particular subcultural metaphysical anthropology and teleology-Kantian-Hegelian philosophy of history and philosophical history thus should not be understood as theorizations of empirical historiography, as they are by White (M 141-43 ). Rather, they should be viewed as the weapons of a rival disciplinary subculture dedicated to combatting empirical historiography and subordinating it to a specifically philosophical or theological cultural politics. If, as we have argued, only those who have first been initiated into Kantian transcendental doubt feel the need or have the ability to treat empirical history as a domain of underdetermined appearances-as inherently rhapsodic, ambiguous, or chaotic-then their claim to have discovered its transcendental structures can only be regarded as a combat strategy or cultural politics for subordinating empirical historiography to a rival intellectual subculture.
The history of German Protestant academic philosophy from Leibniz through Wolff to Kant and Hegel can be understood in part as a sustained attempt to subordinate empirical historiography to metaphysics in order to prevent the latter's historicization. 27 The German metaphysicians sought to revivify various conceptions of the world as a manifestation of transcendental intellection, but now transposing this theistic architecture to the interior of a double-sided human subject-as we saw in the case of Kant's duplex anthropology-from which a philosophical history could be projected as the dialectical unfolding of man's two sides. The objective of this cultural politics was to reinstate a conception of a "creative" or constructive mind at the center of cosmos and culture, thereby transmuting theist into "humanist" metaphysics. This made it possible to insist that the empirical sciences and their objects must have metaphysical foundations; that empirical history is actually the temporal unfolding or becoming of man's transcendental rationality; and that the plurality of confessional religions would eventually be replaced by a rational religion-Kant's "pure religion of reason"-in the course of this transcendental-historical unfolding. 28 These were the central elements of the Kantian ethos or intellectual comportment, and they would prove highly durable and adaptive in providing theological and philosophical elites with a cultural politics aimed at forestalling the autarky of the positive sciences, sidetracking the historicization of theology and philosophy, and subordinating confessional ecclesiastical religions to a "liberal" moral theology or philosophy that was supposed to be their historical destiny.
If this is enough to indicate that White's philosophical history was heir to a Kantian philosophical subculture and cultural politics-rather than to a Kantian "theory of consciousness"-then we can move on to our second concern: to show that White's Kantianism belongs to a specifically American reception of the Kantian subculture, one that had begun in nineteenth-century "liberal" Protestantism and was continued in American idealism and pragmatism. The first and crucial reception of Kantian and Hegelian philosophies in America took place in the Protestant seminaries and colleges of the Northeast, apart from the Midwest outpost of St. Louis Hegelianism. 29 Initially, this reception was shaped by a specific theological conflict. This was between a Calvinist theology of revelation, faith, and predestined redemption (or damnation) that was grounded in the doctrine of man's incapacitation by sin, and a variety of forms of "liberal" Protestant rationalism teaching man's capacity to know the divine will through his own reason, and perhaps even to redeem himself through this same capacity. 30 Kantianism and Hegelianism provided liberal Protestantism with an alternative anthropology according to which, through the dialectical reconciliation of man's intellectual and sensuous sides, it was possible to envisage his progressive moral regeneration into a "higher self." 31 This would supposedly occur through the intellectualist emancipation of thought from empirical facts, and will from sensuous inclinations. In this way German Protestant rationalism provided its American cousin with a double-edged sword useful against both "atheist" empiricism and Calvinist fideism.
Owing to its metaphysical underpinnings, Kant's duplex anthropology was no more "rational" than the "pessimistic" Calvinist anthropology of man's sin-damaged nature, especially if we take Jonathan Edwards's highly rationalist version of the latter as our point of comparison. But the East-coast reception of Kant did provide liberal Protestantism with a powerful cultural-political program based in the idealist core of the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies: namely, that man shaped the world he inhabited through creative intellection, and was capable of transforming himself into its moral governor by realizing his inner capacity for rational self-governance. In this way the American Protestant philosophical theologians not only took over Kant's and Hegel's rationalist attack on confessional religion-their (finally delusive) doctrine that history was itself transforming revealed religion into rational moral philosophy-but also the other main planks of rationalist cultural politics: the notion that the empirical sciences could not be atheistically autonomous, since they too were grounded in a "constructive" intellect, and that theology and philosophy could not themselves be fully historicized, since history was itself the dialectical unfolding of transcendental reason. This last plank was of course the core doctrine of philosophical history and holds the key to its American emergence.
The fact that theological and philosophical anthropologies were not different in kind, and that the latter had emerged from the formerthrough Kant's subjectivist interiorization of the architecture of divine and human being-not only meant that the philosophical reception of Kantianism and Hegelianism could serve theological purposes; it also meant that theological and metaphysical doctrines could assume a rational humanist form in expositions of these philosophies. From the 1840s onwards the key nexus in this regard was that formed between philosophical theology and rational psychology. From their putative common foundation in the "creative human mind," there emerged a philosophical theology that taught man's capacity for rational moral regeneration, and a rational psychology in which Kant's metaphysical distinction between the spontaneous intellect and passive sensory intuition could be used in quasi-empirical psychological and anthropological accounts of human creativity. 32 This psychologized Kantianism and Kantianized psychology pivoted on the doctrine that sensation remained "chaotic" until it had been synthesized by the transcendental structures of the mind, which was in turn man's way of exercising the creative intellect that joined him to divine intuition and will, thereby realizing his "higher self."
This doctrine remained fundamental to American liberal theology and academic philosophy right through to the beginning of the twentieth century, where we can see it operating at full force in Josiah Royce's Gifford Lectures of 1900, The World and the Individual: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being. Here Royce not only located his "theory of being" at the nexus of rational psychology and natural theology, but he did so by deploying Kant's duplex philosophical anthropology, insisting on the primacy of the mind's "selective" ideational capacity as the condition of empirical knowledge. 33 But Royce simultaneously argued that conceptualization be understood in terms of the purposes governing it as an everyday activity, thereby transposing a Kantianized rational psychology and natural theology into a philosophical register that some would call pragmatism (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) . 34 In what would become a magic number for pragmatist philosophical-psychological taxonomies, Royce insisted that there were just four ways in which "being" could be conceptualized: mysticism and realism, which represented the pure rationalist and pure empiricist options; "critical rationalism," which was Kant's Copernican reduction of objects to the mind's ideas of them; and the "fourth" or synthetic conception (345-60). This emerged when Kant's too-rationalist picture of conceptualization was transformed into the pragmatist view of the mind shaping the world to fulfill its teleological purposes, thereby defeating both rationalism and empiricism: "For in the victorious warfare with finitude consists the perfection of the spirit" (382).
We are now in a position to see that the Kantian dimension of White's philosophical history derived not from his direct engagement with Kant's philosophical doctrines-there is little textual evidence of this-but from his participation in this specifically American reception of Kant. Here it was less the detail of the doctrines that mattered than their role in a broadly antiempiricist and moral-rationalist cultural politics. In his earliest attack on the historians-in "The Burden of History" in 1966-White thus situates them in the same dialectical philosophical space that had been charted by the early-twentieth-century idealists and pragmatists, arguing that historians were trapped between a "postivistic" scientism and a "romantic" aestheticism, leaving them incapable of mediating between brute facts and moral judgments. 35 No less strikingly familiar is White's appeal to rational psychology as holding the key to the true mediation of positivist empiricism and idealist aestheticism: "But modern criticism-mostly as a result of advances made by psychologists in the investigation of the human synthesizing faculties-has achieved a clearer understanding of the operations by which the artist expresses his vision of the world and the scientist frames his hypotheses about it." As a result of these fundamental psychological discoveries-White does not say what or when they were-the false middle ground occupied by the historians has "dissolved in the discovery of the common constructivist character of both artistic and scientific statements" (112). Rightly attacked by social scientists and philosophers for its scientific backwardness and by literary artists for its scientistic repression of values-twin failings constituting the "burden of history"-history itself is a symptom of a sick civilization. A cure will only be found, White argues, in the latest "constructivist" outlook that reveals the "metaphors" through which intellectuals select from the raw "data" of history and in doing so imbue it with meaning and value: "Thus for [Hegel, Balzac, and Tocqueville] history was less an end in itself than a preparation for a more perfect understanding and acceptance of the individual's responsibility in fashioning the common humanity of the future" (133).
It is striking, then, that in this early adumbration of White's program we find a recapitulation of idealist-pragmatist cultural politics-a diagnosis of the gap between empiricism and idealism as a cultural disease, an identification of psychological constructivism as a spiritual curative promising moral regeneration-while the Kantian language and tran-scendental architectonics that would shortly appear in Metahistory are almost completely absent. Even more striking, however, is the conduit through which these elements made their sudden appearance in the latter work. For I would suggest that their key source lies neither (as some have argued) in European linguistic structuralism nor in Giambattista Vico's rhetorical historiography, but in a source much closer to the local mix of idealism and pragmatism that informed the earlier essay: namely, in the descriptive metaphysics that White found in Stephen C. Pepper's now largely forgotten World Hypotheses of 1942. 36 In a manner strikingly reminiscent of Royce's The World and the Individual, Pepper offered a taxonomy of the transcendental structures of experience grounded in a rational psychology. He too came up with just four of them: Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism. 37 Pepper's Formism and Mechanism roughly correlate with Royce's mysticism and realism, while his Organicism structurally parallels Royce's critical rationalism, and his Contextualism matches Royce's fourth or pragmatic theory of being. Less important than term-for-term matching, however, is the fact that Pepper offered an updated version of the idealist-pragmatist typology of possible world constructions-grounded in a broadly Kantian psychology and functioning as a metaphysical-moral schematism for diagnosing and curing the cultural illness of failed mediation-for this is what White took from Pepper.
In turning Pepper's four world hypotheses into a particular level of his metahistory-the level of the forms of discursive argumentation-White was able to achieve several important ends simultaneously (see M 13-21). First, in keeping with the program announced in the "Burden of History" essay, he was able to shift the entire burden of stalled civilizational mediation onto the historians. Their oscillation between an unscientific aestheticism and a nihilistic scientism made them vicariously responsible for the cultural schism between irresponsible idealism and positivist empiricism. At the same time, in using Pepper's four transcendental hypotheses to provide a schematism for the role of "metaphor" in structuring historical representation, White was able to present his own philosophical history not just as a metaphysical diagnosis of failed cultural mediation-as we saw in his account of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century historiography-but also as the harbinger of the intellectual curative that would overcome this cultural malady. This would come in the form of the "psychology" or "theory of consciousness" which showed that both science and art, empiricist facts and aesthetic fictions, were in fact reconciled in the transcendental structures of the "historical imagination." Finally, in aligning Pepper's Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, and Contextualism with the four hayden white's philosophical history "modes of emplotment"-Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire-that he borrowed from Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, and then with the four "prefigurative tropes"-Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony-that he borrowed from linguistic formalism, White was able to supply the machinery for a powerful philosophical hermeneutics. Here the recovery of transcendental structures functioned as a form of cultural criticism and cultural prophecy organized around "fashioning the common humanity of the future." Perhaps this will be enough to show that White's transcendental tropology was not grounded in the nature of historical consciousness, but in the metaphysical anthropology and intellectual regimen of a particular philosophical subculture: namely, Kantian philosophical psychology, theology, and history, in the distinctive form in which it was received in the theology of American Protestant rationalism as a combative cultural politics, and then reshaped in the idealist variant of American pragmatism. Part of the answer to our question, then, of why someone would want to undertake the acts of transcendental doubt and reflection associated with Whitean metahistory-given that such acts do not reveal the "conditions of historical consciousness"-is that they formed part of a combative antiempirical philosophical subculture that had arisen in Protestant Germany in the 1780s and subsequently been adapted to the cultural politics of Protestant America. We have not yet broached the question, though, of why certain intellectuals might feel motivated to enter this intellectual subculture, although its promises to realize a "higher self" and a "future humanity" represent significant clues in this regard, which we can now follow up.
IV
To discuss this issue we need to draw on a likely unfamiliar intellectual resource: historical studies of "psychagogy"-practices for the schooling of the mind-in German, Seelenführung and Seelenleitung, later Bildung, all of which refer to notions of spiritual guidance and moral grooming. Such studies are rarely found in histories of modern philosophy, but are well developed in histories of classical philosophy and early Christian metaphysics. 38 A central feature of these studies is their inquiry into the acts of guided self-problematization-the induced anxieties regarding the "chaos" of perceptions, the contradictoriness of beliefs, the uncontrollability of passions, and so on-through which a tiny minority crosses the threshold of subjectivity that leads to philosophical reflection. A second feature of some of these studies is their focus on a particular nexus: that which psychagogy forms between knowledge of the mind and cosmos ("philosophy"), and the self-transformative acts that the protophilosopher is required to perform in order to become the kind of person who will be vouchsafed such knowledge ("spirituality"). 39 Schooling and schools would seem to be the condition of both these objects, since in order to engage in philosophical reflection individuals must first learn how to be dissatisfied with their existing intellectual dispositions-their "chaotic" perceptions, contradictory beliefs, dangerous passions. Similarly, imbuing the mind with the moral or intellectual purity required to behold its own structures is understood as a kind of intellectual grooming or schooling. 40 This process requires some kind of pedagogical institution in which the texts or tradition containing the intellectual architecture-or language game-for this grooming are transmitted or modeled by a master through special pedagogical routines or rituals. Is it possible that the aspiration or desire for intellectual purity and reflexivity that is induced in those undergoing such grooming holds the key to understanding how certain intellectual cadres are motivated to engage in transcendental doubt and reflection? More specifically, if the exercise of transcendental doubt and reflection in Whitean philosophical history cannot be motivated through appeal to the chaotic character of empirical history-since this chaos is a projection of the exercise itself-can this motivation be understood in terms of the existence of a certain kind of schooling of the mind, and the character of the schools in which this takes place?
In order to at least open up these questions for discussion and further research, we can identify three key features of Whitean philosophical history, now approached as a special kind of intellectual grooming housed in a particular sort of school. First, if, as we have argued, White's acts of transcendental doubt and reflection obtain their inner architecture and cultural purpose from an Americanized Kantian philosophical subculture, we can now suggest that they acquire their compelling character from the intellectual purity and reflexivity promised by the acts themselves. If White's assertions regarding the "chaos" of historical perceptions-or the "crisis" of a dialectically conflicted historical consciousness-cannot be understood as confirmable propositions in the history of historiography, we can now suggest that this is because these declarations are aimed at transforming the intellectual disposition of those who make them. The making of these assertions is perhaps best understood as a kind of pedagogical ritual or exercise through which those entering White's variant of the Kantian subculture learn to act on themselves in order to suspend their assent to empirical history and historiography. This is the condition of their turning their attention "inwards," which is to say away from work on historical sources and evidence and towards a certain "work on the self," carried out through transcendental-philosophical figures of thought. Here, we are dealing with something like a spiritual exercise in the "conversion of attention."
The form of philosophical doubt undertaken through the voluntaristic declaration of the historical field's chaotic or divided character thus may be understood as an act of problematization that aspirant philosophical historians perform on themselves. More specifically, it works as a psychagogical device or ritual through which such persons specify what it is about themselves that falls short of a certain ideal of intellectual life: namely, here, their "realist" or "empiricist" predisposition to accept empirical history as already meaningful, prior to the actions of a constructive intellect. This provides the impetus and direction for a particular "work of the self on the self" through which would-be philosophical historians purge this flawed or "diseased" disposition in order to realize a higher self whose purity is reflected in the pure (nonempirical) forms of historical consciousness:
In short, to a significant segment of the artistic community the historian appears as the carrier of a disease which was at once the motive force and the nemesis of nineteenth-century civilization. This is why so much of modern fiction turns upon the attempt to liberate Western man from the tyranny of the historical consciousness. It tells us that it is only by disenthralling human intelligence from the sense of history that men will be able to confront creatively the problems of the present. The implications of all this for any historian who values artistic vision as anything more than play are obvious: he must ask himself how he can participate in this liberating activity and whether his participation entails the destruction of history itself. 41 In short the act of transcendental doubt that initiates philosophical history issues in an intellectual regimen whose aim is not historical knowledge, but the cultivation of a higher self that is capable of beholding and participating in a liberating transcendental truth. This imbues White's philosophical history with some of the key characteristics of an exercise in spiritual grooming.
The second thing to be observed regarding White's philosophical history is that the ethical work on the self that it demands is carried out through a particular kind of hermeneutic work on texts. 42 If we make an exception for archaeology, then it might be said that all historical disciplines involve interpretive work on texts. During the period of the structuralist "linguistic turn" in the 1960s and 70s, however, this disciplinary truism was inflated into a philosophical truth. At that point it was declared that context too is a kind of text, since context could only be known through texts, which was taken to deprive contextual investigation of its role in grounding textual interpretation. Philosophical hermeneutics was thus supposed to go all the way down the chain of interpretations-contexts were just more texts-at the bottom of which were only more interpretations ad infinitum. 43 In defending the statement "History is a text," White thus argued that "every approach to the study of the past presupposes or entails some version of a textualist theory of historical reality," because the "historical past is, as Fredric Jameson has argued, accessible to study 'only by way of prior (re)textualization.'" Contextual description of historical events thus cannot provide an independent ground for the explication of texts, since such description is a "product of processes of linguistic condensation, displacement, symbolization, and secondary revision of the kind that inform the production of texts." 44 It should now be clear enough, though, that despite its psycholinguistic aura, "textualization" here is nothing more than a latter-day version of the Kantian transcendental structuring of experience. To view all objects of knowledge-including context-as mediated by transcendental textual structures thus only makes sense within the Kantianized subculture that we have been describing. Having already demonstrated the voluntaristic character of this subculture, we should have no qualms in turning our backs on the textualist problematization of context. This will permit us to acknowledge that, since the rise of early-modern humanism and historical philology, there have been various forms of historical textual analysis that have indeed presumed an access to contextual evidence that is not itself transcendentally-textually conditioned, even if it is textually recorded and transmitted. These forms of empirical contextual analysis have included philological criticism aimed at resolving undeciphered, corrupt, or interpolated words through knowledge of ancient mores and ways of life; 45 biblical criticism seeking to explicate sacred texts and commentaries in terms of the religious customs and practices of particular historical communities; 46 histories of theology in which theological controversies are discussed in terms of the emergence of local religious movements and conflicts between rival ecclesiastical factions; 47 and histories of political thought in which the meaning of texts is discussed in terms of the roles or offices of their writers-as court humanists, political secretaries, scholarly advisers, jurisconsults-and the circumstances of their exercise. 48 Closer to our present concerns, from the 1930s onwards a powerful contextual analysis of the structures of folktales has been available. Here, narrative patterns have been tied not to supposedly transcendental structures of linguistic consciousness-in the manner of Whitean formalism-but to the habitual imitative formulae required by oral composition and the specialized training of oral bards. 49 Let us suggest then that the "linguistic turn" was nothing more than a turning away-a "conversion of attention"-from these historical-philological forms of contextualism and towards neo-Kantian philosophical inwardness.
Our account of White's philosophical history can be viewed as an appendage to this line of empirical contextualism, since it argues that the structure and meaning of White's texts can be understood in terms of the Americanized version of the Kantian subculture that he had received via the idealist variant of pragmatism. It is in this context that the particular philosophical-hermeneutic form of Whitean textual exegesis can be understood. As we showed in our discussion of his treatment of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century historiography, the point of White's account of the tropological structure of the texts of empirical historians is not to open a corrigible investigation into the historical transmission and reception of the tropes, as learned forms of composition suited to particular historiographic, cultural, and political circumstances. Rather it is to posit them as the transcendental figures required to prefigure an otherwise chaotic or meaningless historical field. This permits the philosophical historian to reveal their presence beneath the "surface" forms of historical texts and, in doing so, to realize the higher self that would otherwise remain trapped within an obtuse historiography claiming to be grounded in empirical evidence. And this in turn explains why, after some initial head scratching by historians, White's philosophical history found its most significant reception in literary and philosophical rather than historical studies. 50 In turning away from external evidence and towards transcendental structures, and in deploying a hermeneutics aimed at the realization of a higher self rather than the philological decipherment of texts, White's philosophical history was not just useless for empirical historiography but actually inimical to it. But it was precisely this dimension of White's philosophical history that facilitated its reception in literature departments, for they had long deployed an inward-looking hermeneutics in which textual exegesis formed part of a practice of aesthetic and ethical self-cultivation. 51 We have suggested that the motivation to engage in the relevant acts of transcendental doubt and reflection hinges on the psychagogically induced desire to realize a higher intellectual self and, further, that the prime locus for this psychagogy is an exegetical "hermeneutics of the self" that is performed on the texts of empirical historians. This further suggests-and this is our third and final observation-that access to the objects of philosophical-historical reflection is contingent on an institution that maintains and transmits the means of psychagogical induction and grooming: the school. For our present purposes the school can be understood as a hierarchically and ritually ordered nexus of students and teachers in which students acquire the desire and the capacity to learn through pedagogically instituted relations-of love and discipline, emulation and surveillance, affirmation and correction-that join them to a teacher who thereby possesses significant charismatic authority. Schools are typically institutions within larger religious, civic, or political cultures whose pedagogical transmission they secure and whose objectives shape the forms and purposes of schooling. We can now suggest that Whitean philosophical history emerged as a schooling of thought within a particular kind of American school: namely, in the network of liberal arts colleges and graduate schools where the higher humanities form the nexus between the mastery of knowledge and moral grooming. 52 As we have seen, this network, which remained dominated by the culture of liberal Protestantism throughout the nineteenth century, provided the context for the reception of Kantian and Hegelian philosophies. This was principally because the psychagogical function of these philosophies-their capacity to organize the world of learning around the spiritual grooming of a higher transcendental self-allowed them to displace the earlier more clerically focused anthropology and pedagogy of Calvinism with a regimen suited to the formation of a broader moral and civic elite. 53 One way of understanding Royce's The World and the Individual and Pepper's World Hypotheses is as teaching texts suited to the moral and civic purposes of American humanities liberal arts colleges and graduate schools. Their role was to deploy their respective typologies of world constructions as metaphysical schematisms through which students could learn to view the cultural cosmos as morally fractured-into its ideal and material, rationalist and empiricist, aestheticist and scientistic parts-and thence to project their higher selves as the condition of transcendental reconciliation.
Conclusion
Let us conclude, then, that White's transposition of Pepper's fourfold metaphysical typology into the transcendental architectonics for his philosophical history is a sign that Metahistory should also be regarded as a teaching text, one that supplied a schematics of spiritual grooming to the upper end of the American humanities academy. Through a hermeneutics that permitted them to discern their own moral fracturing in the cultural divisions that had paralyzed the empirical historians, White supplied his students and readers with a handbook that allowed them to glimpse their own higher selves in the transcendental structures so badly misunderstood by the naïve empiricists. In doing so he helped to school a moral elite whose privilege consists in its members' purely charismatic capacity to order the universe of knowledge around their own imaginal insight into its supposed transcendental structures, and into the dialectical unfolding of these structures in and as history. 
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